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Survivability, capability, maintainability, and relia-
bility will establish the effectiveness of a combat
aircraft. Considerations for the "ilities" must take place
during the conceptual design phase. Retrofit of surviva-
bility enhancement has historically increased weight, drag,
and cost, while decreasing capability and performance.
Proper application of the six susceptibility reduction
concepts and the six vulnerability reduction concepts must
take place before the design is established to maximize
effectiveness and minimize penalties. In this thesis, the
application of survivability enhancement techniques to the
conceptual design is presented in general and also
specifically applied to the design of a long range Strike
Fighter aircraft. General guidelines for susceptibility and
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I. INTRODUCTION
Incorporation of survivability in the initial design
process of an aircraft is a concept that must be used from
the first conceptual sketch a designer produces. Given a
mission, which will include a payload, mission profile, and
other mission specifications, the designer can now begin
the design process, attempting to create the most effective
weapon system possible that meets all of the
specifications. Once the aircraft design is established, it
may be too late to incorporate survivability features that
will make an aircraft ready for actual combat. Post design
survivability enhancement fixes have historically added
weight, drag, and cost, while decreasing range or payload,
speed, and other performance parameters. This thesis
considers the need for survivability enhancement during the
conceptual design process rather than depending upon
retrofit of the aircraft to make it a survivable weapon
system. Survivability considerations during the conceptual
design for a long range strike fighter will be reviewed.
Survivability must be designed into an aircraft, just as
leading edge sweep angle is set for a design mach number.
A. AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY
How is an aircraft made to be a survivable combat
weapon system? This question is not easily answered because
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of the complexity of the aircraft design process and the
interaction of the aircraft's physical parameters.
Previously, many rales of thumb have surfaced as design
guidelines to a survivable aircraft. These design rules
have come from combat experience as lessons learned. During
non-combat years, the military and defense aircraft
industry tend to drift away from combat lessons learned due
to cost and weight constraints. An aircraft without any
survivability enhancement features may have a lower price
tag and also better flight performance than a similar
aircraft with survivability built into it. On the surface,
it may appear that the cheaper aircraft is a better buy.
However, in combat conditions, the aircraft with the
survivability features may be in fact a better aircraft.
The term effective is used a great deal by the aircraft
industry when discussing new designs. Combat attack
aircraft must be effective. They must be able to reach,
locate, and then destroy their target. However, being an
effective aircraft and a survivable aircraft are
interdependent goals. An aircraft that is shot down prior
to the target is not an effective weapon system at all.
Also, an aircraft must be able to safely return from its
mission to complete its goal of effectiveness. Figure 1-1
is an illustration from Thronson [Ref. 1] and shows the
effect of different attrition rates upon the total force.
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Figure 1-1 Force Survivability
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conflict of any duration. Survivability enhancement must be
a consideration during all phases of aircraft design.
Aircraft that are not survivable do not last long as shown
in Figure 1-1.
If an aircraft has survivability features that will
allow it to fly with damage that would otherwise ground or
kill another aircraft, it is a more effective weapon
system. One example is self-sealing fuel tanks that are
more expensive than wet bladder tanks. These two types of
tanks perform exactly the same until they are hit by an
enemy projectile. The cost of the self-sealing tank may be
suddenly justified in terms of survivability.
B. GOALS FOR SURVIVABILITY DESIGN
The goals in making a combat aircraft survivable are
listed in Table 1-1.
TABLE 1-1
SURVIVABILITY GOALS
(1) Delay detection as long as possible
(2) If detected, avoid being fired at
(3) If fired at, avoid being hit
(4) If hit, avoid weapon system kill
(5) If hit, avoid aircraft kill
(6) If hit and not killed, can be easily repaired
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Some of the ways to achieve the above goals may seem to
have nothing to do with aircraft design. For example, the
tactics of an attacking aircraft may be a large factor in
delaying detection. However, the tactics of an attacking
aircraft are built around the aircraft capabilities.
Tactics employ the pilot and aircraft to accomplish their
best in any given situation. Therefore, survivability is
intertwined with the aircraft design.
C. SURVIVABILITY DEFINITIONS
The following five definitions will be used throughout
this thesis and are taken from Ball [Ref. 2].
(1) Aircraft Survivability; The capability of an aircraft
to avoid and or withstand a man-made hostile
environment.
(2) Vulnerability; The inability of an aircraft to
withstand the damage caused by the hostile
ervironment.
(3) Susceptibility; The inability of an aircraft to avoid
(being damaged by) the hostile environment.
(4) Damage Mechanism; The output of the warhead that
causes damage to the target. It is the phsyical
description of the tangible instrument or measurable
quantity designed to inflict damage upon the target.
(5) Survivability Enhancement; Any particular
characteristic of the aircraft, specific piece of
equipment, design technique, armament, or tactic that
reduces either the susceptibility of the vulnerability
of the aircraft has the potential for increasing the
survivability of the aircraft.
Susceptibility restated is the inability of the
aircraft to avoid being hit by an enemy threat mechanism.
Vulnerability restated is the inability of the aircraft to
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withstand stand that hit. Both susceptibility and
vulnerability are terms that denote poor traits in an
aircraft. Thus, we want to reduce both susceptibility and
vulnerability in any aircraft. Susceptibility reduction
refers to survivability goals 1 through 3 and vulnerability
reduction refers to goals 4 through 6.
Susceptibility = P. (Probability of hit)
Vulnerability = Pk/h (Probability of kill
' given a hit)
Probability of kill = P. = P. Pk/h
Survivability = P = 1 - P.
S K.
Thus, to increase aircraft survivability we need to
decrease susceptibility and also decrease vulnerability.
Any conflicts between decreasing vulnerability with a
consequential increase of susceptability must be evaluated
to determine the correct mix to maximize survivability.



















(1) Component Redundancy with Separation
(2) Component Location
(3) Passive Damage Suppression




II. SUSCEPTIBILITY REDUCTION CONCEPTS
A. GENERAL
If an aircraft could be designed to have zero suscepti-
bility in all circumstances, the aircraft would be a
completely survivable combat weapon system. The concept of
zero susceptibility relates to goals 1 through 3. In
reality, no aircraft can be designed and used with zero
susceptibility. Therefore, it is the designer's goal to
reduce the susceptibility of the conceptual aircraft design
to a "satisfactory" level.
B. ELECTRONIC METHODS AND EXPENDABLES
The first three susceptibility reduction concepts of
Table 1-1, which are:
(1) Threat Warning
(2) Noise Jammers and Deceivers
(3) Expendables
may appear to have a very small influence upon aircraft
conceptual design. However, we must realize that the radar
warning receiver, electronic countermeasures (ECM) equip-
ment, and weapons payload are part of the aircraft's total
payload. The aircraft's total payload may be used to obatin
the initial weight approximation for further conceptual
design calculations. For any aircraft during conceptual
design, a combination of payload weight must be selected.
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Figures 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3 are illustrations from
Schlessinger [Ref. 3], where different combinations of
countermeasures equipment and bombs are examined for a
given size attack aircraft. The maximum payload of counter-
measures equipment and bombs for this aircraft is first
established at 10,000 lbs to calculate the approximate size
of the conceptual design. Figure 2-1 illustrates the
increase in P with an increase of countermeasures weight
s
and a corresponding decrease in bombs for a typical surface
to air missile (SAM) encounter. The figure shows that more
countermeausres equipment is better up to a point where the
probability of survival begins to level off. The proba-
bility of survival is established considering all of the
aircraft's survivability enhancement features and the
threat. Figure 2-2 shows the mission attainment measure
(MAM) for the same attack aircraft of Figure 2-1. The MAM
ranges from to 100% target destruction in the presence of
the enemy threat, but without threat effects to degrade the
MAM. The slope of the MAM curve is continuously decreasing
as higher weapons loads and smaller countermeasures loads
are carried. To obtainthe most effective combination of
countermeasures equipment and bombs, the measure of mission
success (MOMS) is calculated.
MOMS = P * MAM (2.1)
s
Figure 2-3 shows MOMS vs. pounds of countermeasures
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occurs at a countermeasure/bomb ratio of approximately 0.4.
This is equivalent to 2,900 lbs of countermeasure equipment
and 7,100 lbs of bombs for the total payload of 10,000 lbs.
If the conceptual design aircraft's total payload
remains constant, these three figures will aid in maximiz-
ing the MOMS. However, if the aircraft's payload is
allowed to increase with more countermeasures equipment, or
more bombs, the design aircraft's weight, size, and P will
change. The payload weight is a very sensitive parameter
for conceptual design weight calculations. For example, an
increase in aircraft payload may mean up to a factor of 3
times that increase in actual aircraft weight. For a new
aircraft design, which is heavier and certainly larger, a
new P„ must be calculated and used to pick the most
s c
effective countermeasures load and weapons load
combination.
C. THREAT SUPPRESSION
Threat suppression is the fourth method listed for
susceptibility reduction. This is a very active means of
increasing survivability. Any type of action that causes
the enemy to reduce the amount of anti-aircraft threat,
will most likely increase survivability. Self-protection
missiles and anti-radiation missiles (ARM) are examples of
threat suppression. They can significantly affect the
survivability and success of a strike. The ability to carry
and effectively use threat suppression weapons should be
considered in any new aircraft design.
22
D. SIGNATURE REDUCTION
A military aircraft has many different types of signa-






These signatures are important parameters when the combat
aircraft is in the conceptual design stage. The reduction
of all of the above signatures are extremely important
because the enemy will use these signatures to detect,
guide, and possibly fuse antiaircraft weapons.
1. Visual Signature Reduction
The four parameters that affect the visual
signature of an aircraft are luminance, chromaticity,
clutter, and movement. Luminance is the most important
parameter effecting the visual signature. The difference
between the background luminance and the aircraft luminance
is the parameter of interest. Special paint and aircraft
lighting can reduce the visual signature of an aircraft by
reducing the contrast of luminance. For the aircraft design
team, the major impact of visual signature is physical
size. The smaller the aircraft the less effect luminance
contrast will have. Because many anti-aircraft weapons are
visually directed, a smaller aircraft may have a better
23
chance for survival and also be more effective because it
is harder to see.
Aircraft engine exhaust smoke is also a major
contributor to the visual signature. However, modern
combustion techniques may have solved the exhaust smoke
problem of turbojet and turbofan engines.
2 . Infrared Signature Reduction
The parameters for the designer that affect the
infrared signature are engine temperatures, the exhaust
plume, aircraft surface emissivity and reflectivity, and
other heat producing aircraft components. If aircraft hot
parts can be cooled or masked, any infrared (IR) counter-
measures used will be much more effective.
The use of turbofan engines reduces the temperature
of the exhaust gases due to the mixing of cool bypass air.
The afterburner of a turbofan however, is much hotter than
the afterburner of a turbojet because more fuel must be fed
to the afterburner section to completely burn the extra
bypass air.
The exhaust plume IR radiation may be reduced by
mixing cooler air with the exhaust just before or immed-
iately after the exit nozzle. A nozzle that can cool the
exhaust plume quickly, is a two-dimensional nozzle. The
circular turbine exit duct is transitioned to a rectangular
exhaust nozzle. The two-dimensional nozzle vortices from
the nozzle corners, induce quick mixing of the exhaust and
24
ambient air. More nozzle perimeter may also help reduce the
IR signature.
3 . Radar Signature Reduction
The conceptual design is the most important
starting point for the reduction of the aircraft's radar
signature. Aircraft radar cross section (RCS) , in square
meters, is the measure of radar signature. Just about every
conceptual design parameter will have an effect upon the











shows that if cr, the RCS of the aircraft is reduced by 50%,
the detection range R is reduced by 16%. A benefit of RCS
reduction that has a earlier payoff is the on-board ECM
equipment becomes much more effective. The on-board jammer
operates one way (between aircraft and radar) so the burn
through range (where the target RCS can be seen through the
jamming) varies as the 1/2 power with o-. From Ball [Ref.







This equation shows that a 50% reduction in o- (RCS) , will
reduce the burn through or detection range by 3 0%. The
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above examples of 50% reduction of RCS may seem like a
large amount, but actual RCS reductions of 8 0% to 9 0% may
be possible.
Figure 2-4 is taken from Ball [Ref. 2], and
illustrates equations (2.2) and (2.3). The figure shows
that the benefit of RCS reduction, is reduced detection
range. Another benefit of RCS reduction, is the on board
jammer power required to maintain a constant jam to signal
(J/S) ratio also decreases with RCS reduction. Reduced
jammer power required will mean a smaller and lighter
jammer, which are both beneficial results to the design.
From Ball [Ref. 2], there are three methods to re-
duce the RCS of an aircraft.
(1) reflection of the radar signal away from any receiving
antenna
(2) absorption of the radar signal by attenuation or
interference
(3) active interference with surface currents
Methods 1 and 2 will directly affect the conceptual design
process. Method 3 is an electronic or material method which
may mean an increase of electronic weight.
Most aircraft construction materials act as
reflectors to a radar signal. RCS reduction method 1
attempts to reduce the radar reflected toward the receiver
as much as possible. This is done by designing the aircraft
with curved smooth surfaces and reducing the number of
sharp protrusions and indentations or cavities. Locations
26
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Figure 2-4 Effects of RCS Reduction
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on the aircraft where a radar signal can reradiate off
multiple aircraft surfaces, are more likely to reflect the
signal in the direction of the radar receiver. Also, for
materials that are radar transparent, care must be taken to
prevent radar backscatter from behind the transparent
exterior. Present construction materials used to make
radomes and canopies are examples of materials that allow
the radar signal to pass through. Structural composites may
also be transparent to a radar signal. However, if a radar
reflective material is under the composite, the resulting
aircraft RCS may be much higher than expected. Major
contributors to aircraft RCS are:
(1) engine intakes
(2) external weapons stations/racks
(3) external weapons
(4) pod mounted engines
(5) radar compartment
(6) cockpit
(7) wing/ fuselage interface
(8) exterior lights compartments
(9) external mounted antennas
(10) leading edges of the wing and stabilizers
Radar absorbent material (RAM) can be used in
vehicle areas where reflection of the electromagnetic
energy away from the radar receiver is difficult. However,
the RAM may be very heavy material, and its radar absorbent
28
qualities may be frequency dependent. RAM can be used by
the design team in those local areas of high RCS where
reflection away from the radar receiver is impractical due




The aural signature of an aircraft may be a factor
in the aircraft's survivability during combat. With
reduction of the aural signature, detection of the aircraft
may be delayed. Antisubmarine aircraft may be more
concerned with aural signature than fighter or strike
aircraft due to the battle field they probably will operate
in. Propulsion systems contribute most of the aural
signature, and different methods can be used to reduce the
level of noise. Current civilian aircraft use noise
reduction designs to reduce noise around airports.
Trade-off studies will indicate the benefit of noise




The electromagnetic emissions from a military
aircraft must be considered when designing for low aircraft
signatures. While intentional electromagnetic emissions may
aide the aircrew in accomplishing their mission, the enemy
may use the aircraft's electromagnetic emissions to detect
and fire upon the aircraft, particularly if the other
signatures have been significantly reduced. Communication,
navigation, and weapons delivery equipment that are
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passive, or are of very short duration, reduce the active
emissions from the aircraft.
E. TACTICS
Susceptibility reduction by the use of tactics is a
very important method of increasing survivability. Tactics
for combat aircraft vary greatly depending upon the
aircraft, mission, threat, weapons, and many other
influencing conditions. The use of proper tactics will give
the combat aircrew the best chance to complete their
mission and safely return. The tactics are essentially
built around the aircraft's capabilities and the mission it
is to fulfill.
When the military sends a request for proposal (RFP) to
industry, the tactics that the future aircraft will use
have had a direct impact upon the specifications contained
in the RFP. In a sense, the threat that the aircraft will
meet drives the tactics, and the tactics drive the RFP
(specifications) . The aircraft company now must design an
aircraft that will meet as many of the specifications
possible and be more "attractive" than the competition.
Table II-l contains many conceptual design parameters that




CONCEPTUAL DESIGN PARAMETERS THAT INFLUENCE TACTICS
(1) Mission Profile





(7) Take Off Distance
(8) Landing Distance
(9) Signatures
(10) Weapons Payload (Type and Number)
(11) Avionics and Countermeasures Equipment
(12) Instrumentation (Radar, Cockpit Displays)
(13) Special Capabilities (In Flight Refueling, Carrier
Launch/Arrest, etc.)
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III. VULNERABILITY REDUCTION CONCEPTS
A. GENERAL
The reduction of aircraft vulnerability takes into
consideration that the aircraft has already been hit by one
or more damage mechanisms. Survivability goals four through
six of Table 1-1 are associated with aircraft vulnerability
reduction. Table 1-3 lists the six vulnerability reduction
concepts that will be discussed in this chapter. The con-
ceptual design team should always take into consideration
the vulnerability of the design of the aircraft and strive
to reduce it.
To determine the vulnerability of an aircraft, the
possible causes of an aircraft kill must be identified. The
damage or loss of any component that leads to an aircraft
kill is identified as a critical component. Table III-l
lists five possible critical components. Each of the
critical components is evaluated to determine the
probability of component kill (P
lc /'h ) / given a hit on the
component. The P^/v, for each component is calculated due to
impact of a fragment or penetrator. The determination of
Pk/h ^"s difficult to accurately determine. Testing of the
component to determine the component probability of kill
will aide the analysis, however, incendiary effects,
fragment breakup, and spall must also be considered. The
32
more protected a component, the lower the Pk/h may become






(4) Flight Control System
(5) Major Structural Members
The area of the component presented to the damage
mechanism is multiplied by the component Pk/h to obtain the
component vulnerable area (A ) . Each component vulnerable
area will change with different aspect to the damage
mechanism shotline. Components that are redundant or
provide a backup function, (e.g., two engines) are called
redundant critical components if the loss of more than one
of these components leads to the loss of the aircraft. The
aircraft vulnerable area (A^,) , is the combination of the
individual nonredundant and redundant critical component
vulnerable areas. The vulnerability reduction concepts of
Table 1-3 will reduce the vulnerable area of the critical
components and the vulnerable area of the aircraft. The
goal of a "small" vulnerable area should be strived for by
the design team.
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B. COMPONENT REDUNDANCY WITH SEPARATION
The entire aircraft, from the major aircraft systems to
the weapons the aircraft will carry, must be evaluated to
determine the nonredundant and redundant critical com-
ponents. Once these critical components are identified, the
addition of a similar or identical component for the
purpose of redundancy will move the nonredundant critical
component to the list of redundant critical components.
With each change of a nonredundant critical component to a
redundant critical component through the addition of redun-
dant components, the total vulnerable area of the aircraft
will be reduced. With any component redundancy that is
designed into the aircraft, the redundant components must
be separated to preclude a single hit from killing both
components
.
In addition, further vulnerability assessment for
multiple hits on the aircraft may indicate a requirement
for more redundancy (i.e., four flight control computers).
Not all nonredundant critical components will increase
survivability through redundancy. If the damage of an
nonessential component will cause the ultimate loss of
another flight essential component, the damaged
nonessential component is also a critical component. The
damage modes of a component that could cause ultimate loss
of the aircraft are explosion, fire, and loss of essential
fluids. Examples of these damage modes are:
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(1) liquid oxygen (LOX) bottles explosion
(2) ammunition drum explosion
(3) fuel tank fire/explosion or loss of fuel
(4) loss of essential hydraulic fluid
For the designer, the above discussion means that
redundancy of any critical component that reduces the
aircraft's vulnerable area is highly desirable. However,
redundancy of critical components with adverse damage modes
may increase A-. and decrease aircraft survivability. The
damage mode and effects analysis (DMEA) of each component
being studied must be conducted to determine the damage
effect upon the vulnerable area.
C. COMPONENT LOCATION
Positioning of critical components during the aircraft
design process has a direct impact upon the aircraft's
vulnerability. From Ball [Ref. 1], component location
design techniques include:
(1) positioning noncritical or tougher components to
provide shielding for critical components
(2) effectively separating redundant components to ensure
true single hit redundancy
(3) compactly grouping or overlapping critical components
to reduce the aircraft vulnerable area or to present
the least vulnerable aspect to a damage mechanism
4) locating or isolating components such that the
possibility of cascading damage is reduced or
eliminated
An example of improper positioning of a component is
placing fuel tanks above, next to, or directly below any
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hot surfaces such as engines or hot bleed air lines. If an
enemy penetrator initiates a fuel leak onto the hot
surface, fire damage or explosion may cause loss of the
aircraft.
D. PASSIVE DAMAGE SUPPRESSION
Passive damage suppression is any vulnerability re-
duction feature that tends to contain or reduce the damage
effects of a damage causing mechanism. Further, the passive
term indicates that the survivability feature is built into
or around the system, and initiates no responsive action
following a hit by a damage mechanism. Passive damage
suppression design techniques include damage tolerance,
ballistic resistance, delayed failure, leakage suppression,
fire and explosion suppression, and fail-safe response.
1. Damage Tolerance
Damage tolerance means that any aircraft component
can continue to operate at an acceptable level after being
damaged. This design technique also means that damage to a
component will not propagate to other critical components.
An example of a damage tolerant component is the aircraft's
control surfaces. An elevator that is missing 25% of its
surface area may not operate to peak efficiency, but with





Ballistic resistance means that part or all of a
damage mechanism is prevented from penetrating the
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component. Most ballistic resistant materials are high
strength and also very heavy in weight. The designer must
consider the weight penalty and possible increase of
susceptibility with the use of ballistic resistant mater-
ials. The designer may employ this technique by protecting
a critical component with a ballistic resistant casing or
by fabricating the component from a ballistic resistant
material. An example of ballistic resistance is a flight





Delayed failure of a component will allow the
aircraft to safely continue flight for a period of time
after a damage mechanism has struck the aircraft. The
desired length of time that a component will operate
depends upon the function performed and the aircraft's
mission. Time until failure of these components will range
from allowing a safe return to base, to long enough to
allow the crew to eject from the aircraft while if still in
controlled flight. An example of delayed failure is an





The prevention of leakage of any aircraft fluid is
highly desirable. The retention of the fluid for use and
also the prevention of the fluid from entering an area that
could result in combustion are two benefits of self-sealing
37
design. Self-sealing construction has penalties of cost,
weight, and increased size.
5. Fire and Explosion Suppression
Many projectiles are designed to cause combustion
related damage after penetration. Antiaircraft artillery
(AAA) projectiles may be either high-explosive (HE) or
armor-piercing (AP) . These projectiles may also contain an
incendiary mixture (I) or a tracer material (T) . HE-I
antiaircraft projectiles are very common and are designed
to produce secondary combustion damage to the aircraft. Any
combustible material that can be ignited by the HE-I
penetrator may cause a great deal of damage or even loss of
the aircraft.
The suppression of fire and explosion can greatly
decrease the vulnerable area and increase survivability due
to the large amount of flammable material carried by
tactical aircraft. Techniques to suppress fire and explos-
ion are to prevent ignition, or to prevent the flame front
propagation after ignition first occurs.
The design team must recognize any areas where combust-
ion could occur. Fuel tank ullages and voids near fuel
tanks or engines may provide the proper fuel air mixture
for combustion. The removal of the combustible vapor by a
forced inert gas system will not allow ignition to occur
from any HE-I projectile or other source. Flexible foam in
the fuel tanks will reduce the possibility of damage due to
overpressure if ignition occurs. All of these survivability
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enhancement features have design penalties. The penalties
may include increased cost, weight, maintenance, and
decreased fuel volume available.
6. Fail Safe Response
Any component that must be controlled over a wide
range of conditions may become uncontrollable and revert to
an unflyable operation if damaged in combat. Engine
throttle control is a good example of the possible
application of this technique. If the throttle to fuel
control linkage becomes severed, fail-safe response will
position the engine at a flyable power setting. Movable
engine intake ramps are also critical to allow proper
operation of the engine. If a ramp goes to a supersonic
position while at low speed, a great deal of thrust is
lost, possibly resulting in loss of the aircraft. Component
designers must consider all possible damage to equipment
that may be critical to flight.
E. ACTIVE DAMAGE SUPPRESSION
This design technique will actively reduce or contain
the damage effects caused by a damage mechanism. The system
incorporates a damage sensing ability with either an
automatic response or a warning light to allow the pilot to
take appropriate action. The most common example is a fire
warning indicator with automatic or pilot operated fire
extinguishers. Another example, is a fluid level sensor in
the hydraulic reservoir that can detect a hydraulic leak
and isolate the leak by an automatic isolation valve.
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F. SHIELDING
The shielding of a component prevents the damage
mechanism from reaching the component. Shielding may also
be used to separate components and therefore isolate any
damage. Because shielding must be very strong, the weight
penalty may be significant. If shielding is necessary, the
armor may be designed as a functional load carrying part of
the aircraft. If armor plate is installed only in the
shielding roll, it is parasitic; armor plate that is
attached on the outside of an engine bay door is parasitic.
However, if the engine bay door is constructed of a
shielding material, the aircraft weight may be reduced.
Shielding may also be used to separate two engines that are
physically very close together. Damage to one engine can
not cascade to the other engine because of the shielding
between them.
G. COMPONENT ELIMINATION
The removal of a critical component from the design may
decrease the aircraft's vulnerability if the function the
component performed is no longer required, or another less
vulnerable component can replace it. If complete
elimination cannot be accomplished, any reduction of size
will be beneficial. An example of component elimination is
a fuel efficient aircraft that requires less fuel to
accomplish its mission. Smaller fuel tanks mean less
weight, reduced cost, and hence less vulnerable area.
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Another example, is the replacement of LOX containers with
a less vulnerable on-board oxygen generation system.
H. FINAL THOUGHTS
During conceptual design, most individual component
designs are not considered. However, the size of each
component, the location of the component, and system
routing could affect conceptual design decisions. If this
affect is not considered in the conceptual design, a latter
change of the the design to reduce vulnerability may not be
allowed, because of performance and/or fiscal constraints.
Designing an aircraft without concern for vulnerability
reduction, because the aircraft's performance reduces it's
susceptibility, may be very short sighted. Antiaircraft
threats are increasing in capability with every new system
introduced. Also, a 20 million dollar aircraft that is
killed by a 200 dollar 7.62mm small arms weapon, is not
justified. Performance and capability are required of
modern combat aircraft, but because of their high cost, the
purchase of high numbers of advanced aircraft may not be
possible.
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IV. SURVIVABILITY FROM THE REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL
A. THE REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL
The Department of Defense (DOD) has the very difficult
task of predicting national defense threats. The DOD must
study the threat and propose a system that can counter it.
Because new aircraft systems may take ten to twelve years
or more to design and begin construction, the sooner the
defense industry and the DOD can select a design to
develop, the quicker an aircraft can be put into service.
The RFP from DOD to the aircraft industry is the first
draft of the specifications that may be required for the
system. The specifications that are contained in the RFP
are an attempt to meet the proposed threat that this
vehicle will counter. The RFP specifications may be very
specific, or they may prescribe the general outline of a
new system and allow the defense industry to develop a
detailed solution.
The aircraft conceptual design process is the
systematic approach by the aircraft industry to satisfy the
requirements of the RFP. The conceptual design phase is the
idea level where aircraft shape, major component location,
and sizes are studied. The conceptual design process will
define the following:
(1) Concept that should be selected for more detailed
design study.
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(2) Technology of the aircraft that must be developed.
(3) Technology risk assessment of new systems.
(4) Impact of the required technology upon the concept.
(5) Economic constraints and risk assessment.
Table IV-1 lists possible RFP specifications that DOD
may send to the aircraft industry. Some of these
requirements may be specific, and others may indicate the
general desires of the DOD. The example of size/weight
limitations may come from aircraft carrier restrictions.
Many of the specifications deal with aircraft capabilities.
These capability specifications may directly affect the
aircraft's susceptibility (e.g., the specifications on
signatures and performance) , and the "survivability" speci-
fications may mainly address the aircraft's vulnerability.
B. SURVIVABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
The requirements of the RFP are guidelines that are
used to begin the conceptual design process. The
requirements that are given will be used to estimate the
aircraft's weight/size, aerodynamics, and propulsion
parameters. These parameters are then packaged together to
give design concepts that will be candidates for further
design study.
As in many engineering disciplines, some design
objectives may conflict with other, also important,
parameters. This is especially true when considering

































4 Avionics and Countermeasures Equipment
5. Survivability
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increasing the maximum speed of a design will mean larger
engines and also larger fuel tanks to fly the higher speed.
The increased speed may decrease susceptibility, but the
larger engines and fuel tanks will probably increase
vulnerability. This conflict of parameters has led to
survivability being a consideration after the design has
been completed. Mott and Freitag [Ref. 4:pp 4 6-47] discuss
the problems and deficiencies of current aircraft design
practice. The discussion focuses on the problem that
aircraft survivability has not been a part of the
conceptual design process. This problem is most recognized
when retrofit or follow-on design survivability enhance-
ments cause performance compromises and/or significant cost
increases that would not have been required if done during
conceptual design.
The conceptual design process today is heavily
computerized. The automation of the design process permits
the quick analysis and evaluation of the concepts under
study. Simplified engineering computations that often rely
on historical data are the basis for the computer
automation. The historical data provides the data base for
initial sizing, optimization, and trade off studies. The
incorporation of survivability enhancements in the computer
computations may not exist at this point because the
aircraft of the past have not been specifically designed
for survivability. New technology impact, incorporation of
45
survivability enhancement, and unusual aircraft configur-
ations have to be adjusted for, because previous aircraft
statistics cannot account for these new design factors.
1. Susceptibility of the Design
The ability of the aircraft to avoid being hit by
an enemy damage mechanism depends upon many factors. Many
RFP specifications will directly influence the
susceptibility of a design. Many specifications will affect
several design parameters, and as mentioned previously,
some desired specifications may compromise other design
goals. A brief presentation is given below of the impact of




In general, the smaller the aircraft, the
harder the aircraft is to hit. Smaller size may also
contribute to reduced signatures.
b. Weight
The weight depends somewhat upon size, however,
many light weight materials such as composites may replace
heavier aircraft materials without loss of strength.
Reduced weight will affect many performance parameters as
well as allowing smaller engines (same thrust/weight)
,




The reduction of all aircraft signatures can
decrease susceptibility. During conceptual design of a
strike fighter aircraft, the radar and visual signatures
will be most affected by aircraft materials, paint,
geometry, and size. IR signature reduction is mostly a
function of the engines and nozzles.
d. Mission Profile
The profile should utilize the best cruise
altitude and mach number until detection becomes possible.
From the possible detection point, minimum exposure time to
hostile action while maintaining a minimum detection
profile is desired.
e. Weapons Payload
Because the payload is such a sensitive design
parameter, the minimum acceptable weapons payload should be
considered. Increased accuracy of weapons (e.g., precision
guided) will allow reduced payloads at the same mission
attainment measure. Longe range launch and leave weapons
will allow the aircraft greater flexibility in the target
area, and greater offensive range. Reduced payloads will
also allow smaller aircraft size or increased fuel load and
range.
f. Maximum Speed
The less time the aircraft is exposed to enemy
action, the less susceptible the aircraft will be during a
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ground attack. High speed may also increase tracking
errors. Speed for the fighter role, will increase available
maneuverability and intercept capability. Enemy missile
threat envelopes may decrease in size due to increase
speed.
g. Turning Performance
Higher turning performance may give the
aircraft an advantage in the air to air role. For the air
to ground mission, high turn rates used in jinking may
reduce firing accuracies of antiaircraft weapons.
2 . Vulnerability of the Design
The last RFP requirement of Table IV-1 is
survivability. The survivability of the aircraft after
being hit depends upon it's vulnerability. The
survivability requirement of the RFP normally addresses
vulnerability reduction as earlier specifications relate to
susceptibility. The ability of the aircraft to withstand a
hit by an enemy projectile is influenced by many factors.
The reduction of vulnerable area of the design will
decrease vulnerability and thus increase aircraft
survivability.
Figure 4-1 is from Briggs [Ref.5], and shows combat
aircraft losses by functional area. This data, derived from
the South East Asian conflict, indicate that the fuel
system was the highest cause of aircraft loss. This agrees








Figure 4-1 Aircraft Losses by Functional Area
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largest area to enemy damage mechanisms and has the largest
Pk/h*
The six vulnerability reduction concepts will be
considered in each of the following aircraft functional





(5) flight control system
Where the designer must compromise between vulnerability
reduction and susceptibility reduction, a study of the end
results must be made to determine the best selection of
susceptibility and vulnerability reduction concepts.
a. Structures
The structure of the aircraft includes all load
bearing and aerodynamic shaping structures. The design of
the primary structures should be redundant to allow for
full loading after damage has occurred. The entire
structure should also be as damage tolerant as possible to
reduce design vulnerability. The materials used in the
construction of the aircraft will greatly effect the
vulnerability of the structure. Desired material properties




Although the crew station presents a small area
to the enemy, it must be a part of the vulnerability
reduction effort during the design level. Space around the
cockpit is limited, so proper placement of noncritical
components may provide some protection for the crew.
Shielding of the aircrew and critical components in the
cockpit, may be required to protect the crew station from
threat projectiles. Parasitic shielding with armor should
be avoided, as extra weight and bulk may be a penalty.
c. Propulsion System
The propulsion system includes the engine,
intake, exhaust duct, lubrication system, accessories, and
engine power controls. All of this equipment must be in
good operating condition for the propulsion system to
produce designed thrust for the aircraft. Because these
subsystems are critical to the production of thrust, the
vulnerable area of the propulsion system may be high.
Complete loss of engine thrust may come from foreign object
ingestion, inlet flow distortion, and fuel ingestion. All
six vulnerability reduction concepts may be used to
increase the survivability of the propulsion system.
Redundancy with separation, will prevent
aircraft kill from a single hit. Separation of multiple
propulsion subsystems is required due to adverse damage
effects that may cascade from one component to another, and
to preclude a single hit kill.
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Proper location of the propulsion system
components, may prevent aircraft kill. Propulsion system
hot surfaces should not be near any type of flammable
substance in order to prevent fire or explosion. Engine
intakes and fuel tank interfaces should be avoided to
prevent fuel ingestion, foreign object ingestion, or inlet
flow distortion.
Passive damage suppression can be applied in
many ways to reduce the probability of propulsion system
kill. The engine may be less complex and have less moving
parts, resulting in the ability to construct the engine
with greater damage tolerance. Ballistic resistant
construction of critical components in the propulsion
system may be considered. Lubrication systems may be
constructed of self-sealing materials. Engine throttle
controls may be designed to fail to a flyable power setting
if the system is severed.
Active damage suppression may include a fire
detection and extinguisher system in each engine bay with
multiple shot capability. Engine performance instruments in
the cockpit may allow early shutdown of a damaged engine
and prevent secondary damage effects. Automatic engine
shutdown may be considered in multiple engine aircraft,
however the ability to override the automatic shutdown
should be available to the pilot if the situation calls for
drastic measures.
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Component elimination can directly reduce the
vulnerable area of the propulsion system. Furthermore, the
reduced number of components may reduce the size and weight
of the engine.
Shielding critical components that are still
vulnerable to damage mechanisms should be considered after
other vulnerability reduction concepts have been applied.
Parasitic shielding should be avoided, as extra weight will
be a penalty. Shielding may also act as the firewall to
contain areas of possible fire and explosion,
d. Fuel System
The fuel system may represent the largest
contributor to the aircraft vulnerable area. Vulnerability
reduction can greatly reduce the Pk/u and thus the
vulnerable area of the fuel system. The fuel system
includes the fuel tanks, transfer lines, pumps, and valves.
Fuel depletion, fire/explosion, or hydraulic ram may lead
to aircraft kill. Fuel depletion may be prevented by;
(1) self-sealing tanks and lines
(2) redundant tanks and lines
(3) ability to cross feed tanks and engines
(4) capability to gravity feed engines
(5) transfer lines inside fuel tanks to reduce vulner-
able area
Fuel fire and explosion suppression techniques may include;
(1) fire detection and extinguishers
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(2) forced inert gas in fuel tank ullages and voids
(3) fuel tank foam to reduce explosion overpressure
(4) material in dry bays, voids and ullages to prevent
explosive mixtures
(5) antimisting fuels
Hydraulic ram is a damage process of a
compartment that contains a fluid. When a penetrator enters
a liquid compartment, energy from the projectile is
transferred by pressure waves through the fluid. The tank
may suffer severe rupture due to the high pressures on the
walls of the container. The hydraulic ram damage may affect
other components if the tank walls are adjacent to other
critical components. Hydraulic ram damage may be reduced
by;
(1) minimum fuel tank, engine and engine intake interface
(2) dual walled tanks where adjacent components are
critical
(3) smooth fuel tank contours to prevent high pressures
(4) tear resistant tank materials
(5) large volume tanks may absorb greater pressures
e. Flight Control System
The flight control system includes all control
surfaces, control linkages, flight control computers, and
the hydraulic systems to power the control surfaces.
Disruption of control signal, loss of control power, loss
of motion sensors, damage of a control surface, and
hydraulic fluid fires may lead to an aircraft kill. The
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control system was the third largest contributor to
aircraft vulnerability during the South East Asian
conflict.
Direct mechanical control systems are changing
to analog or digital fly by wire control systems. Advances
in flight control technology with high speed computers
allow the designer to relax the static stability of the
aircraft to increase the aircraft's performance. Component
vulnerable area of these complex control systems may be
reduced by applying the six vulnerability reduction
concepts.
Redundancy of the entire control system may
prevent a single hit kill. Greater redundancy of vulnerable
systems may be considered to reduce probability of kill to
multiple hits. Control surfaces may also be designed to be
redundant. Independent vertical tails, leading and trailing
edge devices, speed brakes, and horizontal tails may
provide adequate control if one control surface is
completely ineffective. For fly by wire control systems,
the flight control computer must be able to sense the loss
of a control surface and apply the remaining control
surfaces to the aircraft control laws. This system may be
referred to as a self healing flight control system.
Component location may prevent the loss of
several components due to one hit. For example, redundant
control cables or wire bundles should not be collocated.
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They should be routed to take advantage of other components
as protection, and also separated by enough distance to
ensure true single hit redundancy.
Fail-safe response shall be designed for all
control surfaces. Given any control component failure, no
control surface shall be given a hard over command. This
may allow time for corrective action or at least time for a
controlled ejection.
Active damage suppression may be applied to
reduce the Pk/h of the control system. The ability to
switch from a fly by wire to a jam free mechanical system
is an active response to a failure.
Shielding of flight control components is a
possible way to reduce the vulnerability. However, proper
redundancy with separation may be a better use of the extra
weight. If shielding is still to be used, it should protect
as many critical components as possible without
compromising redundancy with the lack of separation.
Component elimination can reduce vulnerable
area by reducing the physical size of the control system.
The smaller system will also be harder to hit. High
technology flight computers are being built smaller and
smaller which reduces vulnerable area. Hydraulic actuators
that only contain fluid for themselves will reduce the
vulnerable area by elimination of the lines and reservoirs.
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C. LONG RANGE STRIKE FIGHTER RFP
A long range strike fighter will be examined here as an
example of the survivability enhancement features
previously discussed. The aircraft as designed, must be
able to perform its mission, and survive in the hostile
environment.
A multirole strike fighter may be a compromise of
performance goals, but because of the high cost of combat
aircraft and limited space on aircraft carriers,
multimission aircraft must be considered. Air superiority
over the battle field and also the ability of self
protection must be included. The example guidelines for the
aircraft are given below.
1. Configuration
The Strike Fighter must be capable of operation
from aircraft carriers. All size and weight limitations
associated with carrier operation shall be met. Both size
and weight shall be as small as possible while still
satisfying all specifications.
All aircraft signatures shall be as small as
possible. The visual signature shall be reduced by small
size prior to applying other visual reduction techniques.
The radar cross section shall be reduced to delay
detection. Internal weapons, fuel, and electronics shall be
considered to reduce the RCS . RAM and active interference
shall be considered following all efforts to reflect the
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radar signal away from the radar receiver. The infrared
signature shall be reduced to minimize aircraft
susceptibility to IR detection and missiles. A two
dimensional nozzle shall be considered to reduce the IR
radiation of the exhaust plume. Aural signature shall be as
small as possible, however there shall be no compromise of
performance capability.
The strike fighter crew size shall be as small as
possible without sacrificing aircraft capability. Crew size
shall be no more than two.
2 . Performance
The Strike Fighter mission profile is shown in
Figure 4-2. Maximum range altitude and mach number is flown
until maximum enemy radar range. From that point, speed
shall increase to minimize the reaction time available to
the enemy. At the range of predicted radar detection, low
altitude ingress shall be flown utilizing the terrain to
reduce detection possibility. Speed in the target area
shall be at least mach 1.2. Supersonic weapons delivery is
desired.
Weapons payload of the strike fighter are four 1000
lb medium range Skipper weapons, two Sidewinder air to air
missiles, and one 2 0mm gun with 3 00 rounds. The internal
bomb bay shall also be able to carry and launch two Harpoon



































































max speed at altitude: mach 1.8
max speed at sea level: mach 1.2
max ceiling: 50,000 ft.
approach speed: 13 5 kts
take off distance: 3000 ft.
landing distance: 3500 ft.
max load factor: n = 9
sustained turn(M=.9, 15K) 16 deg/sec
instantaneous turn (.9, 15K) 22 deg/sec
(10) acceleration( .9 to 1.4, 30K) 50 sec max
3 . Special Considerations
The special considerations of the strike fighter
RFP directly affect conceptual design. The life cycle of
the aircraft will have an impact upon the size and weight
of all load bearing structures. Maintenance and reliability
may affect the decisions on the location of each aircraft
component. Easy access to components that require frequent
maintenance is desired. Avionics and countermeasures
requirements of the RFP may go into great detail to specify
the capability required. The designer must reserve space in
the aircraft design for all equipment, and also provide the
required environment. Location of the avionics and
countermeasures equipment should be considered. Strike
Fighter avionics and countermeasures equipment shall be
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located to reduce aircraft RCS, and drag. Location of the
electronic equipment shall not compromise their own
performance.
Survivability specifications of the RFP set the
vulnerability posture of the design. Specific guidance for
vulnerability reduction may be given, however the Strike
Fighter RFP presented here will give general guidance and
allow the aircraft industry to package the design.
Vulnerable area considering a single enemy hit shall be as
"small" as practicable. Strike fighter survivability,
performance, and capability goals shall be equal in
importance.
D. NEW AIRCRAFT TECHNOLOGY
Using technology that is readily available may be
referred to as off-the-shelf technology. There may be many
reasons to use off-the-shelf technology including low risk,
cost, maintenance, and high reliability. However, to
significantly increase the survivability, performance, and
capabilities of combat aircraft, new technology must be
developed. Examples of emerging technology that may offer
high payoffs for military aircraft are:
(1) signature reduction
(2) supersonic cruise
(3) active flutter suppression
(4) self healing flight control systems
(5) relaxed static margin
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(6) thrust vectoring
(7) terrain flight management
(8) rough field capability
(9) advanced composites





(15) surfaced launched air targeted air to air weapons
(16) advanced air to surface weapons
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V. STRIKE FIGHTER CONCEPTUAL DESIGN
The RFP has stated that performance , capability, and
survivability should all be equal goals during the concep-
tual design. Many design parameter compromises will have to
be studied as goals conflict in some areas. Utilization of
new technology may aide the designer in overcoming some
conflicts.
A. GEOMETRY
The strike fighter initial layout is shown in Figures
5-1 and 5-2. For the canard wing configuration, the wing
aerodynamic center is behind the aircraft center of
gravity, and thus the wing is stabilizing. Therefore, the
canards function only for control and thus require less
area. Volume coefficients of canards are 1/4 to 1/2 of
conventional horizontal tails. The canards are located
immediately aft of the cockpit to preclude any visual
interference, and also aide in smooth changes of aircraft
cross sectional area.
The internal bomb bay is large enough to carry and
launch the specified payload of four Skippers or two
Harpoon missiles. Sidewinders are located on each wing tip,
and blended into the wing as much as possible. The 2 mm
gun is located in the port wing root, and is completely










































cavity to reduce its contribution to the RCS . The membrane
will be destroyed after the first round out of the gun.
Top mounted engine intakes may aide in reducing the
aircraft's RCS from depressed angles. The edges and
interior of the intakes will be made of a radar absorbant
material. Top mounted intakes will also reduce probability
of foreign object damage due to loose objects on the
ground. Auxiliary intake doors are included in the design
to aide engine performance at high angle of attack. These
doors will normally be closed, and will open automatically
as the aircraft increases angle of attack.
Aircraft wing loading (W/S) is a design parameter that
has conflicting results. Low wing loading will generally
increase turning performance particularly at low speed,
while high wing loading will aide in fuel efficient cruise
flight. Turning performance is affected by the coefficient
of lift (CL ) and aircraft thrust to weight (T/W) ratio.
High aspect ratio (AR) wings will be more efficient at
subsonic speeds, while a low AR will reduce drag at
transonic and supersonic speeds. Low AR is also much
simpler to construct resulting in lower structural weight.
Figures 5-3a and b are from Spearman [Ref. 6], and show
fighter aircraft wing loading and thrust to weight trends.
Figure 5-3b illustrates aircraft agility potential, which
is the T/W divided by W/S. This shows that the higher W/S
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Thrust-to-weight versus combat wing loading





































increase of T/W will recover the lost agility. The Strike
Fighter T(max)/W(t.o. ) is 1.1 and the W(combat)/S is 60.6.















































Root Cord 8.13 ft
Tip Cord 1.2 5 ft
Taper Ratio 0.15
Mean t/c 4%
tical Tail Geometry (Total Expo




Root Cord 8.13 ft






Max Height 5.8 ft
Max Width 9.4 ft
Inlet Capture Area 3.7 sq. ft
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B. STRUCTURE
The structure is designed to be damage tolerant to
enemy damage mechanisms. Major structural components are
redundant to prevent a single hit kill. The aircraft is
designed with a wing that may utilize a straight through
wing box. This will allow a lighter wing box that is also
easier to construct. Ring frames may also be used near the
engine to support the wing.
The fuselage is designed with smooth changes of shape
to reduce and redirect its contribution to the RCS
.
Continuous load paths in the fuselage will reduce
structural weight. The blended wing body is designed to
reduce supersonic drag and thus reduce fuel consumption.
Secondary benefits from the blended wing body are:
(1) thicker wing root for fuel or landing gear
(2) reduced subsonic C, nx
' dO
(3) improved span efficiency
(4) increased drag divergence Mach number
The use of construction materials other than
conventional aluminum will aide the designer in reducing
the aircraft's weight and corrosion problems.
Organic composites are increasingly being used to
reduce aircraft weight. The F-18's structure is approx-
imately 2 0% composite by weight. With 2 0% composites, the
aircraft's structural weight is reduced by approximately
10% below that of conventional aluminum. Maximum use of
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composites may only increase to 60% because many aircraft
structural components such as landing gear, engines, and
engine mounts can not be constructed from composites. An
aircraft constructed from 60% composites would reduce the
structural weight by approximately 16%. This information is
presented by Powers, Driggers, and King [Ref. 7], All high
weight payoff structures of the Strike Fighter are
constructed of composites. This reduces the estimated
structural weight by 10%.
C. CREW STATION
Because the Strike Fighter is a single pilot design,
ballistic protection of the cockpit will be provided. The
floor and lower sides of the cockpit are a two-plate
composite armor that can defeat 2 3mm HEI projectiles. Two
of the aircraft's four flight control computers are also
protected by the same armor. From Remers [Ref. 8], it is
estimated that the armor system weighs eight lbs/sq. ft.
The life support system includes an on board oxygen
generation system (OBOGS) combined with an on board inert
gas generation system (OBIGGS) . This system eliminates the
need for vulnerable LOX converters.
D. PROPULSION SYSTEM
The Strike Fighter is a two engine design, and all
propulsion subsystems are redundant. The engines are
separated by a vertical shield to prevent cascading damage.
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Two multiple shot fire extinguisher systems are located
between the engine intakes. The engines are a "rubber"
variation of the F 4 04 engine with afterburner.
Specifications for the "rubber" engine are listed below.
(1) Nominal Thrust 18,700 lbf
(2) Static Airflow 163 lbm/sec
(3) Engine Weight 1,990 lb
(4) Engine Length 152 inches
(5) Max Diameter 33 inches
(6) Compressor Face Dia. 29 inches
(7) Pressure Ratio 25:1
(8) Two-D. Nozzle Length 30 inches
The top mounted intakes are designed to minimize the
aircraft's RCS from monostatic radars on the ground. The
intakes are a two shock design which will provide 9 0%
pressure recovery up to Mach 2.0. The auxiliary air intakes
are designed to minimize thrust loss at high angles of
attack during subsonic flight.
Two dimensional exhaust nozzles are designed for thrust
vectoring, IR and RCS signature reduction. Independent
exhaust nozzle vectoring may increase turning performance
and aircraft control redundancy. Vectoring may also reduce
take off and landing distance. The extension of the exhaust
system due to the nozzle addition may decrease propulsion
system vulnerability from small IR guided missiles guiding
on the hot tail pipe.
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E. FUEL SYSTEM
The fuel requirement of the Strike Fighter is 11,500 lbs
or 1,692 gallons of JP-5. Fuel Tanks in the wings require
270 cubic inches/gallon of jet fuel. If foam is used in the
wing tanks to suppress fires and explosion in the ullage,
3% fuel retention and 2% fuel displacement will cause an
increase to 284 cubic inches/gallon required. Fuel tanks in
the fuselage require 251 cubic inches/gallon. The Strike
Fighter wings contain 5,000 lbs of fuel and the fuselage
contains 6,500 lbs of fuel. The fuselage tanks are located
in the aircraft so that there is no fuel tank and engine
inlet interface. The fuselage tanks are also located away
from any aircraft hot material, such as engines, to prevent
a fire due to leaking fuel. The fuselage tanks are inerted
by the on board inert gas generation system (OBIGGS) to
reduce tank vulnerability to fires and explosions. Six
separate fuel tanks (four in the wings and two in the
fuselage) provide redundancy and reduce the possibility of
kill due to fuel depletion. Each engine feeds from a
separate fuselage sump that can gravity feed the engine if
required. Both fuselage tanks are constructed of self
sealing materials over the lower half to preserve get home
fuel. Figures 5-4 and 5-5 indicate the fuel tank
locations.
Extra fuel tanks may be placed in the bomb bay in place































































for ferry missions. Total fuel load for ferry is 14,500
lbs.
F. FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
A quadruplex fly by wire flight control system will
independently manage the following control devices.
(1) Leading and Trailing Edge High Lift Devices
(2) Independent Canards
(3) Rudders on Each Vertical Stabilizer
(4) Vectoring Nozzles
Artificial intelligence will be used in the flight control
system to manage the various devices to account for damage
to one or more of the the devices, i.e., self healing.
Routing of control wire bundles are separated in the Strike
Fighter to prevent any single hit kills.
Flight control hydraulic systems have been replaced by
actuators that contain hydraulic fluid only for themselves.
Electric actuators that do not require any fluid are also a
possibility for the Strike Fighter. All actuators are
redundant and designed to be jam resistant.
G. AVIONICS AND COUNTERMEASURES
The Strike Fighter avionics and countermeasures
equipment are all internal to the aircraft. Electronic
countermeasures (ECM) equipment that is matched to the
aircraft must have sufficient volume reserved during
conceptual design. Aircraft signatures will have a direct
impact upon the proper ECM equipment selected. ECM
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equipment location may be critical to effective operation
and must also be considered during conceptual design. Some
aircraft equipment is extendable when required for use
including the forward looking infrared receiver (FLIR) and
laser target designator. Extending this equipment will
increase the aircraft's RCS. Expendables may be launched
from both the top and bottom of the aircraft fuselage
depending upon aircraft altitude. An all weather radar is
integrated into the low altitude attack navigation system.
A standard avionics and weapons bus allows for quick change
of electronic equipment to meet specific requirements.
Increased electronic warfare equipment may be mounted in
place of the weapons in the bomb bay.
H . WEAPONS
All weapons of the Strike Fighter, except the
Sidewinders, are internal. The aircraft is sized to carry
either Skipper or Harpoon. Folding fins on the internal
weapons allow for compact carriage in the bomb bay.
Sidewinder fins are also folded during carriage to reduce
their contribution to the aircraft's RCS. The high accuracy
of these weapons allow a minimum weapons load to obtain a
high MAM. The reduced payload will allow survivability
enhancement without severe aircraft performance penalties.
The extended delivery range of these weapons may allow the
aircraft to never enter the enemy's antiaircraft weapons





Effectiveness ranking of combat aircraft is very
difficult. Aircraft have different capabilities for each
mission they perform. Some "popular" capabilities concern-
ing aircraft effectiveness are maximum speed, payload,
range, turn rate, target detection range, weapon accuracy,
and weapon launch range. Note the absence of survivability
in these "popular" measures. However, any valid study of
combat aircraft effectiveness must include survivability in
the evaluation.
Multi-mission aircraft such as the Strike Fighter pay
penalties to be able to perform more than one mission.
Performance penalties from vulnerability and/or suscepti-
bility reduction should normally be avoided, however a
decline in aircraft performance may be justified if there
is an increase in effectiveness of the aircraft.
B. MAXIMUM SPEED
Increasing the speed of early combat aircraft was
important as faster aircraft were often better in combat.
Maximum speeds of WWI aircraft averaged approximately 12
kts. Faster aircraft could always attack slower aircraft
and also safely disengage when the situation dictated. An
aircraft that was 2 5 kts faster than the average had a
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significant advantage. The 145 kt aircraft was 21% faster
than the average.
WWII propeller driven aircraft maximum speeds were
approximately 3 60 lets. The introduction of the gas turbine
powered Me 2 62 launched a new era in aircraft and maximum
speed. The maximum speed of the Me 2 62 was 47 kts at
20,000 ft. Although the Me 262 had some design problems,
its performance advantage was recognized by all. [Ref. 9]
The maximum speed of the aircraft of the Korean
conflict was near Mach 0.9. Best cruise speed for these
aircraft was from Mach 0.8 to 0.9. Because the maximum
speed and cruise speed were close, they flew near their
maximum speed all of the time. Afterburners for extra
thrust and speed were developed soon after the jet engine,
but operational Korean conflict fighters did not have them.
Intuitively, more speed for a combat aircraft would
make a better aircraft. Vietnam conflict aircraft had
maximum speeds in the Mach 2.2 area. More than 100,000
sorties of Mach 2.2 capable aircraft were flown during the
Vietnam conflict. [Ref. 10] However, as Figure 6-la shows,
the capability of high Mach was not used in the combat
arena. Figure 6-lb shows the reason that high Mach numbers
are not used in combat. The maximum turn rates and minimum
turn radius for today's aircraft (major parameters for
close in combat) takes place in the Mach 0.7 range.
Cornering speed, the speed of maximum turn rate, is a
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I//ETA/AM COMBATSPEEDS
• NOT ONE SECOND OF FLIGHT COMBAT TIME AT MACH 2.2 SPEED
(OR ABOVE) WAS RECORDED.
• NOT ONE SECOND OF FLIGHT COMBAT TIME AT MACH 2.0 SPEED
(OR ABOVE) WAS RECORDED.
• NOT ONE SECOND OF FLIGHT COMBAT TIAAE AT MACH 1.8 SPEED
(OR ABOVE) WAS RECORDED.
• ALMOST NO TIME AT 1.6 MACH (OR ABOVE) WAS RECORDED
(SECONDS).
• EXTREMELY LITTLE FLIGHT TIME AT 1.4 MACH (OR ABOVE)
WAS RECORDED (MINUTES).
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Figures 6-la & 6-lb
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function of maximum lift and maximum load factors. While
the capability of high Mach may be used to intercept and/or
disengage the enemy, cornering speeds are where air to air
combat will take place. The high thrust to weight ratio
that allowed Mach 2.2 was actually used by the pilot to
increase turning performance.
The Strike Fighter performing an air to ground attack
may use speed differently than during the fighter mission.
The aircraft attempts to fly as low and as fast as possible
to hide from radar and other detection systems. Maximum
speed may reduce the exposure time to enemy weapons.
However, strike aircraft normally operate at low altitudes
to take advantage of terrain masking, and flying both
extremely fast at low altitude may be difficult to safely
accomplish. Furthermore, the properties of the atmosphere
make high speed flight at low altitude very fuel costly.
Maximum speed is a function of dynamic pressure (q)
.
2
q = .5 * density * V
Figure 6-2 shows a constant dynamic pressure of 1700 PSF.
At sea level, 1700 PSF equates to Mach 1.07 or 708 kts TAS
,
where as 1700 PSF at 40,000 ft equates to Mach 2.50 which
is equal to 1,4 34 kts TAS.
Figure 6-3 shows a corridor for a low level strike.
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Simplified corridor along which an aircraft might make a low level strike
[Ref. 11]
2.0
Figure 6-3 Low Level Strike Corridor
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to compressibility, especially if the aircraft must be fuel
efficient at subsonic speeds. Buffet at low altitude is
very fatiguing on the crew however, it can be safely
maintained for short periods of time. This effect may be
reduced by use of digital fly-by-wire control systems.
However, at too high a ground speed, the aircraft can not
follow the terrain without excessive acceleration on the
aircraft.
Another approach is to fly very high and very fast with
a small RCS to delay detection and reduce enemy reaction
time. Precision guided weapons would be used to maintain a
high MAM.
C. PAYLOAD RANGE
Aircraft payload range is another very important
performance parameter. Payload range is the product of
weapons payload and range in nautical miles. Aircraft
mission profile must be constant when comparing different
aircraft. For aircraft carriers, high payload range means
that the carrier may launch attack aircraft further away
from hostile territory. High payload range for fighters
also allows intercept further from the carrier (outside
hostile weapons launch range)
.
Figure 6-4 shows the flexibility that high payload
range will give an aircraft. For short range missions, the
aircraft may reduce fuel load and increase weapons payload.















4 6 8 10
RANGE (100 NM)
Figure 6-4 Payload Range
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for increased fuel. Drag is not a factor for the Strike
Fighter when considering weapons loads up to 4000 lbs.
Weapons loads over 4000 lbs have to be externally carried,
which will increase drag and aircraft RCS . Aircraft A of
Figure 6-4 is similar in size to the Strike Fighter,
however all weapons and extra fuel are mounted externally.
Aircraft A's advantage may be short range fighter missions
where the external fuel tanks and weapons racks may be
dropped off the aircraft.
D. WEAPONS EFFECTIVENESS
Also important to combat effectiveness is the
effectiveness of the weapons that the aircraft will employ.
High technology weapons which are higher in lethality will
allow a lower payload for a specified MAM. However, high
technology weapons may be ineffective when higher technol-
ogy countermeasures are used. For example, low technology
weapons, such as the gun, must be considered for the
fighter, the "dumb' 1 iron bomb capability must be considered
for the attack aircraft.
The product of explosive payload and aircraft range for
a specific aircraft profile may give a relative estimate of
effectiveness. However, weapons type and delivery range
also affects the aircraft capability. A weapons adjustment
factor may aide in evaluation of the aircraft design.
Possible adjustments for air to ground weapons are:
(1) Mk 80 series 0.7
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(2) Cluster Weapons 0.9
(3) Short Range Guided 1.1
(4) Long Range Self Guided 2.2
Air to air weapons adjustment factors may be:
(1) Gun 0.7
(2) Short Range Radar Guided 1.1
(3) Short Range IR Guided 1.4
(4) Medium Range Radar Guided 1.6
(5) Long Range Self Guided 2.2
The payload range of the Strike Fighter is shown with
different air to ground weapons and is based upon these
adjustment factors.
(1) Two Harpoon 2,200,000 nm-lb explosive
(2) Four Skipper 2,200,000 nm-lb explosive
(3) Four Mk 83 1,400,000 nm-lb explosive
E. MEASURE OF MISSION SUCCESS
The MOMS which is discussed in chapter two, uses both
probability of aircraft survival and the mission attainment
measure to evaluate the aircraft effectiveness. Figure 2-3
shows the maximum MOMS is approximately 0.72 for the SAM
encounter. Because the MOMS is relatively flat near the
maximum value of 0.72, a slight reduction of the MOMS which
will slightly decrease the MAM and increase the P may mean
a great deal to force levels over an extended conflict.
Figure 1-1 shows that a small variation in the loss rate
over a 30 day conflict may significantly change the force
remaining.
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Strike Fighter MOMS are dependent upon mission and
weapons carried. The design decisions in this study were
made by evaluating the MOMS using the Skipper against a SAM
site, and extensive vulnerability reduction design concepts
are incorporated into the Strike Fighter to increase P .
With the MAM increased by precision guided weapons, the
MOMS is increased. Long range weapons delivery will also
increase the MOMS by increasing P . A weapons payload that
is destructive and also keeps the aircraft outside enemy
threat envelopes is effective. These high technology
weapons allow a lighter payload and can maintain a high MAM
without increasing the aircraft's susceptibility.
F. VULNERABILITY AND SUSCEPTIBILITY ASSESSMENT
The effectiveness study of combat aircraft must include
vulnerability, susceptibility, and survivability assess-
ment. Because no aircraft can have zero susceptibility,
vulnerability reduction may be critical to the aircraft's
survival. The Strike Fighter is designed to have a "small"
vulnerable area. Many of the design decisions that reduced
the vulnerable area had no adverse effect upon aircraft
performance because this reduction was accomplished in the
conceptual design stage.
Vulnerability and susceptibility reduction may cause a
penalty in increased weight and cost. The benefits of armor
at the cost of decreased performance may be difficult to
judge, but a pilot would certainly accept a 1% loss of
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thrust for a 75% decrease of IR signature. A trade off
study early in the design of the aircraft will indicate if
the reduction features are worth the increase in financial
cost. These survivability enhancement features may never be
cost effective if the aircraft is never used in combat, but
if the kill of one 30 million dollar aircraft is avoided,
the entire program cost may be recovered.
Several computer programs can be used to assess
survivability of the conceptual design aircraft. These
computer programs require various levels of input data to
provide aircraft probability of survival in a given
scenario. Some of the inputs may be:
(1) Hostile Defensive Weapons
(2) Characteristics of the Hostile Weapons
(3) Aircraft Mission Profile



















The above assessment programs must start with a design
so the the software can analyze it. However, the designer
wants information from the survival analyst to determine
appropriate design selection. Automated computer design may
allow survivability assessment of various designs in a very
short time. Trade-off studies of the output may aide in
design decisions. Other factors that also affect design
decisions are aircraft reliability, maintainability,
repairability, and life cycle costs. Trade-offs must take
all of the desired aircraft qualities into account. A
balance of trade-off studies must be used prior to
establishing the design. The aircraft's performance,
capability, survivability, and maintainability must all be
considered while at the same time satisfying cost
constraints. The most effective aircraft possible must
always be the goal of the design team.
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VII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. EFFECTS OF CONCEPTUAL DESIGN DECISIONS
The conceptual design of a combat aircraft is a very
complex process. The interaction of hundreds of design
parameters affect the design aircraft. The goals of the
aircraft are also complex and there often must be some










The solution to some compromises may come through
emerging technology. Technology such as:










The proper application of the above aircraft technology
must be considered during the conceptual design to obtain
the maximum results. Retrofit of aircraft may not increase
aircraft combat effectiveness up to that possible in
conceptual design.
B. SUSCEPTIBILITY REDUCTION
Many of the conceptual design decisions will affect the
probability of hit, or aircraft susceptibility. Reduced
susceptibility and increased aircraft performance seem to
relate to each other, but susceptibility reduction is much
more than just increased aircraft performance. The six
susceptibility reduction concepts are repeated below.
(1) Signature Reduction
(2) Tactics




Because of the survivability goals of Table 1-1, and
the interaction of the concepts, the above list of suscep-
tibility reduction concepts has been reordered. The
survivability goals one through three which are:
(1) Delay detection as long as possible
(2) If detected, avoid being fired at
(3) If fired at, avoid being hit
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The order may give a more effective aircraft if the
conceptual design team works from the top down to satisfy
the survivability goals. Table VII-1 lists susceptibility
reduction design guidance.
Susceptibility and vulnerability reduction along with
aircraft capability, reliability, and maintainability will
result in the aircraft's combat effectiveness. All of the
" ilities" must be considered to obtain the most effective
aircraft possible.
C. VULNERABILITY REDUCTION
Reduction of the probability of aircraft kill given a
hit on the aircraft is accomplished by application of the
six vulnerability reduction concepts repeated below.
(1) Component Redundancy with Separation
(2) Component Location
(3) Passive Damage Suppression
(4) Active Damage Suppression
(5) Component Shielding
(6) Component Elimination
These vulnerability reduction concepts may aide the
designer in accomplishing goals four through six of Table
1-1 which are:
(4) If hit, avoid weapon system kill
(5) If hit, avoid aircraft kill
(6) If hit and not killed, can be easily repaired
Table VII-2 lists possible aircraft kill modes and design
guidance to reduce the probability of kill given a hit.
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TABLE VII-1


















































Make provisions for internal
electronic jammers and
associated equipment














































No fuel tank/ line and hot
surface interface
Ullage inerting or foam




smooth fuel tank contours
damage tolerant fuel tanks
Redundant engines
No fuel tank and engine intake
interface
Hydraulic ram tolerant engine
intakes





















(c) Reduction in size
(d) Ballistic/temperature tolerant
linkages
(e) Jam free design
(a) Leak suppression
(b) Ballistic resistant actuators
(c) Location of actuators
(d) Rip-Stop actuators
(e) Fail-safe position
(a) Reconfigurable control surfaces
(b) Damage tolerant









(b) Damage tolerant construction
(c) Fail-safe (multiple load paths
and crack stoppers)




Combat aircraft of tomorrow must be able to perform
many missions. The complexity and cost of modern combat
aircraft will not permit a large quantity to be produced.
Production rates of new aircraft can not be rapidly
increased during a crisis because of the supply of critical
material. Furthermore, survivability modifications may not
be possible after the start of hostilities due to the
length of the conflict and the time necessary for modifica-
tions. Survivability enhancement must be applied to our
aircraft during the conceptual design process.
Combat aircraft conceptual design has not included
survivability enhancement in the past, because surviva-
bility features were not included in previous aircraft. The
strict historical basis for conceptual design can be made
more flexible with computer aided design as a tool.
Furthermore, allowances for survivability enhancement and
unconventional design can fit into the computer aided
conceptual design process. Application of susceptibility
and vulnerability reduction concepts during conceptual
design may financially cost very little, while
significantly increasing combat effectiveness.
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